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approximately one day and two hours denied the"Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce brought by the Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The trial Court did not err in its finding at the 
Petition for Modification hearing that there was no substantial 
change of circumstances which would justify a consideration of a 
change in custody. 
2. The trial Court did not err in failing to make 
sufficiently detailed Findings of Fact with regard to its 
analysis of whether there was a substantial change of 
circumstances. 
3. The trial Court did not err in its finding that 
even if there was a substantial change in circumstances, it would 
not be in the best interest of the minor children of the parties 
to change custody from their mother to their father. 
4. The trial Court did not err in failing to sustain 
counsel's objection to hearsay evidence being presented. 
5. The trial court did not err in denying the 
Defendant's Motion for Amendment of Findings of Fact. 
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the L^ielUu, .... ' — < ^lldr°" " v ^ -r ^ah 
until January --T * ^ — *micn time .^ . :vej 
without prior notice to the Defendant, and without revealing her 
or the children's whereabouts to the Defendant..." This 
contention is erroneous and was disputed., In discovery 
materials and in letters authored by counsel for the Plaintiff, 
the Plaintiff asserted that she did indeed move in January of 
1986. However, the Defendant did know where she and the boys 
were living. Counsel for the Plaintiff would further indicate 
that the relocation out of state had already been a subject of a 
prior Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. This previous 
matter which was litigated was found not sufficient to* warrant a 
change of custody. This matter was and is res adjudicata. 
In fact number 6 the Defendant states, "In May of 1986, the 
Plaintiff requested the older boy, Isaac, come to live with the 
Defendant who had since remarried his present wife, Letha 
Pierce..." Again this is a misstatement of the facts. The 
Plaintiff testified that Isaac requested he be allowed to live 
with his father for a period of time shortly after his maternal 
grandmother died. Isaac was concerned that his father would die 
and that they would not have been able to establish a viable 
relationship. The Plaintiff acquiesced in this request. (T143, 
T144). The Defendant also testified that he knew the 
arrangements for Isaac to live with him would be temporary and 
was for a one year period only. (T206). The Plaintiff also 
disagrees with the statement made by the Defendant that Isaac 
lived with him from May, 1986 until November, 1987 save the 
summer visit in the summer of 1987. Rather, it is the 
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the Plaintiff1s phone number was unknown to the Defendant. The 
Plaintiff testified that in January, 1988 the Defendant was made 
aware of her then current home telephone number. (T171). The 
Plaintiff also testified and presented documented evidence that 
subsequent to the removal in November 1987 the boys were able to 
telephone their father on a regular and frequent basis. (T170). 
Counsel for the Plaintiff and her client realize that each 
case should be addressed and examined upon its individual merits. 
However, each feels very strongly that this Court should take 
notice of the numerous, previous litigations, all of which were 
instigated by the Defendant, attempting to change custody for 
reasons just as specious as those presented on appeal. The Court 
should also take judicial notice that the Defendant failed to 
return the boys to the Plaintiff at the end of the summer 1989 
visitation. Instead, he initiated another Petition to Modify the 
Decree of Divorce. An interim hearing was held on the pending 
petition. Judge Murphy, in the fall of 1989, did order the 
children to be returned to the Plaintiff. The petition for 
modification which was filed in the summer of 1989 has not been 
fully adjudicated and is still pending. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The synopsis provided by the Defendant and his counsel is 
inaccurate and should not be sustained. Certainly there was no 
change of circumstances which rose to a legally cognizable level 
which would even permit, much less justify, transferring custody 
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of the parties1 minor sons from the Plaintiff to the Defendant. 
If indeed there were any errors made by the Court, it was simply 
that the Court, in its exercise of discretion, allowed the 
Defendant to attempt to relitigate matters which had been 
previously adjudicated in several other litigations promulgated 
by him. Never at any time was the Plaintifffs relinquishment of 
physical custody ever intended to be a permanent change of legal 
custody or a permanent change of physical custody. The parties 
understood and the Court did agree that the Defendant would have 
an extended visitation with the parties1 minor children from 
July, 1987 through June of 1988. Unforseen and compelling 
circumstances did require the Plaintiff to regain physical 
custody of the parties1 minor children in November, 1987. 
The Defendant has indicated that the Plaintiff has 
demonstrated instability in numerous moves. It is conceded that 
the Plaintiff has relocated from Utah to Nevada then to 
California and is currently a resident of Reno, Nevada. However, 
there is no indication that there was any instability during any 
of these moves. At all times, the boys were well cared for and 
enrolled in school. The school records, which were introduced 
into Court, demonstrate that both boys were achieving more than 
satisfactory results in their academic pursuits. Nor did the 
custody evaluator indicate that the boys were unstable, insecure, 
or maladapted. 
The Defendant also maintains that the refusal to provide a 
home telephone number is indicative of instability. On the 
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contrary, this is not an indication of any type of instability 
but is indicative of an attempt to restore stability to her 
family. As the Plaintiff testified at trial, she had received 
several threatening and harassing phone calls from the 
Defendant's current spouse. In order to gain control over who 
was contacting her at her current residence, she had her 
telephone number changed. This number remained undisclosed to 
the Defendant for a very, very short period of time. (T202). 
The Defendant and his attorney argue that merely because a 
custody evaluator made a determination it was egregious error not 
to follow the same. However, the evaluation that was performed 
did not sufficiently meet the criteria of whether or not there 
was a substantial change of circumstances in events subsequent to 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce which would warrant a change 
of circumstances. The Court heard testimony from several 
witnesses and also interviewed the minor children in camera. 
After fully considering all matters, not just the report of the 
evaluator, it was the Court's finding and ruling that even if 
there was a change of circumstances, it would not be in the best 
interest of the children to change custody from the Plaintiff to 
the Defendant. 
Counsel for the Defendant and the Defendant also maintain 
that the Court erred in allowing prejudicial hearsay evidence to 
be admitted. Arguably, the testimony of the Plaintiff which 
related the motivation and necessity to remove the children from 
the Defendant's domicile may have been hearsay. However, it was 
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properly admitted as a known and acceptable exception to the 
hearsay rule. Arguably, even if not an exception to the hearsay 
rule, the testimony that was allowed was not prejudicial and did 
not erroneously impact the decision of the trial Court. There 
was no admission of hearsay which was so erroneous and 
detrimental to the Defendant that a reversal of the trial Court's 
decision would be warranted. 
The Defendant and his counsel also argue that the Court 
prejudicially erred in denying the Defendant's motion to amend 
the Findings of Fact. The material he wished to be incorporated 
into the Court's findings were not relevant to a final 
determination of custody. The matters the Defendant wished to be 
incorporated dealt with the abuse of the Defendant's stepdaughter 
Amy and a foster child, Steven Slater, who had been residing in 
the Defendant's home. However, the issue of whether or not there 
had been any abuse of any minor children by either the Defendant 
or his current spouse was an irrelevant, tangetal issue, whether 
or not there had been any abuse by the Defendant or his current 
spouse was not relevant to whether or not (a) there had been a 
legally supportable change of circumstances which would warrant a 
change of custody or (b) it would be in the best interest of the 
children to transfer custody as prayed for by the Defendant. 
Failure to include totally irrelevant findings is not erroneous 
and should not be a successful ground to reverse a proper 
decision. 
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REBUTTAL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF 
FINDINGS THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The Defendant and his attorney seem to argue that this Court 
has been adopting and proliferating inconsistent standards of 
review for modification of custody awards. This allegation and 
conclusion is erroneous, A review of the historical chronology 
of modification cases is absolutely telling. In 1982 the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the legal requirement that a court must 
bifurcate its analysis whenever presented with change of custody 
issues. Hogge v. Hogge, Utah, 649 P.2d 51 (1982). As stated 
and articulated in Williams v^ Williams, 655 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982) 
at 652: 
Under the two-step procedure established by 
this Court in that case, a trial court's 
decision to modify a divorce decree by 
transferring custody of a minor child must 
involve two separate steps. Hence, the 
first issue in this case is whether the 
proponent of any change (appellant in this 
case) has demonstrated "(1) that since the 
time of the previous decree, there have been 
changes in the circumstances upon which the 
previous award was based; and (2) that those 
changes are sufficiently substantial and 
material to j.ustify reopening the question of 
custody. 
Not in any subsequent case has the two-prong test established in 
Hogge, infra, ever been abandoned nor have the original 
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directives of Hogge ever been abandoned. Specifically, trial 
courts and appellate courts have been directed not to change 
custody unless there are very compelling legal reasons which 
would justify the same as stable custody arrangements are 
critically important. 
Arguably, in Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 
1989) the Court did indicate that a greater variety of evidence 
may be introduced to satisfy the initial prong of the Hogge, 
supra, bifurcated standard. No case subsequent to Hogge, supra, 
has ever deviated from the conclusions which must be sustained by 
the evidence presented to successfully transfer custody. A clear 
articulation of what the evidence must conclusively prove is 
found in Shloj i v^ Shloji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985). In Shioji, 
at page 200 the Court stated: 
In Becker v. Becker, we stated that to meet 
the threshold showing of a change in 
circumstances, 
A party (seeking a transfer of custody) must 
show, in addition to the existence and extent 
of the change, that the change is 
significant in relation to the modification 
sought. The asserted change must, therefore, 
have some material relationship to and 
substantial effect on parenting ability or 
the functioning of the presently existing 
custodial relationship. 
Irregardless of whether this Court makes a determination that the 
standard established in Kramer v. Kramer, 7 38 P.2d 624 (Utah 
1987), or the standard established in Maughan, supra, is the 
appropriate standard to apply, the Defendant failed miserably to 
document that there had been any substantial change in 
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circumstances which had any substantial effect on the parenting 
ability of the Plaintiff or the functioning of the presently 
existing custodial relationship. Applying either standard or 
both standards, it is unequivocally clear that there had been no 
change of circumstances which would warrant a transfer of 
custody. 
Counsel for the Defendant and the Defendant argue that it 
would be appropriate for this Court to apply the standard set 
forth in Maughan v. Maughan, supra. Their rationale is that the 
parties' minor children had been subjected to "ping-pong" custody 
arrangements. It is absolutely a deliberate, inappropriate 
misstatement of facts to represent that the parties' minor 
children had been involved in a "ping-pong" custody arrangement, 
when the Court granted the Defendant extended visitation with 
Isaac and Isaiah, it was known by all parties that this extended 
visitation was for a period of one calendar year only. (T144, 
T145, T146, T206, T84). The Defendant at no time subsequent to 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce in 1981 has ever been the 
legal custodial parent of either child. For the year that was 
the subject of this Petition to Modify Custody, the Defendant was 
only a physical custodian of his sons. They were to be domiciled 
in his home with the consent of the Plaintiff and the Court for a 
period of one year. This temporary change occurred primarily 
because the Plaintiff wished to foster and encourage a 
relationship between the minor children and their father. (T180, 
T181). The Defendant attempts to damn the Plaintiff precisely 
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for doing a charitable and difficult act which she believed was 
in the best interests of both her former spouse and their minor 
sons. It is inconceivable that anyone would attempt to distort 
the facts so badly to achieve their purposes. 
The Defendant makes an inference that the Plaintiff acted 
wrongfully and improperly in removing both boys from his home in 
November, 1987. Considerable amount of testimony was taken at 
trial wherein the Plaintiff explained the very objective, 
rational, proper reasons for her actions as a concerned mother 
and as the legal custodian of these children. The Plaintiff 
testified that she had been informed by the children's teachers 
in Eureka, Utah that Isaiah was withdrawn and had been missing a 
significant amount of school. Isaiah also confirmed that he did 
get in trouble in school frequently and was not making many 
friends. In addition to the information regarding the boys1 
welfare at school, the Plaintiff learned of suspected abuse by 
the Defendant and his current spouse which was alleged to have 
been perpetrated upon the Defendant's stepdaughter and a foster 
child residing in the home. Before taking any initiative to come 
to Utah, the Plaintiff contacted a Mr. Scofield, an individual 
employed by the Department of Family Services in Juab County, 
Utah. The Plaintiff was told that it was very likely, if not 
certain, that Isaac and Isaiah were going to be placed in foster 
care if they were not removed from the Pierce household as the 
Juab County Department of Family Services believed there may be 
endangerment to the childrenfs welfare. Premised upon these 
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multiple conversations with multiple individuals, the Plaintiff 
came to Utah and met with a County Attorney who not only 
indicated it was proper for the Plaintiff to take physical 
custody of her children but that she and her current spouse 
should accompany the Sheriff when the childrem were picked up. 
(T153 through 169, inclusive). The Plaintiff peaceably regained 
physical control of her minor children. Moreover, she did inform 
the Defendant prior to the time that she and the children boarded 
the plane to return to Nevada exactly why she was having the 
children return with her. (T169). The Defendant indeed 
acquiesced in these actions by replying to her explanations, 
"Fine." (T169). Only after realizing that the children no 
longer were with him and only after having a sufficient period of 
time to fuel his anger and disappointment did the Defendant file 
a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. 
The Defendant and his attorney on page 12 of the Appellant's 
Brief make an argument for application of the Maughan, supra, 
standard. It is uncertain as to which prior court case reference 
is made. The Defendant has been extremely litigious. Although 
he has brought several post divorce Petitions to Modify the 
Decree of Divorce, he has always failed to prevail. It is the 
Plaintiff's proffer and absolute recollection that each and every 
time she came to Court there was extensive discussion, proffers 
of evidence, and direct testimony given which facilitated a 
review of what would be in the children's best interests. Never 
at any time has the trial Court sustained a transfer of custody. 
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Moreover, it is the position of the Plaintiff and her attorney 
that because there have been so many prior litigations and so 
much scrutiny made of every little incident which occurred 
subsequent to 1981 that the trial Court should have been barred 
from considering anything which had been previously adjudicated. 
In essence, the trial Court should not have considered anything 
which was the subject of previous attempts to change custody and 
should only have examined events which occurred subsequent to 
June, 1987. It is extremely telling and compelling that although 
the Defendant was allowed to reintroduce and relitigate 
previously adjudicated matters in order to attempt to establish 
an alleged pattern of interference with his visitation rights he 
still failed to prove the alleged pattern of interference, to 
prove that there had been any legally cognizable change of 
circumstances which directly impacted and impaired the 
functioning of the parenting relationship between the Plaintiff 
and the children, and once again failed to prevail on a petition 
presented for a record seventh or eighth time. 
For nearly three pages of his brief, pages 12, 13, and 14, 
the Defendant and his attorney assert a third reason for applying 
the standard of the Maughan case. Counsel does not disagree with 
the fact that there can be legitimate post divorce problems 
experienced by noncustodial parents in exercising their 
visitation rights. However, the situations referred to by the 
appellant and his attorney in this brief and the inferences made 
in this third argument are absolutely not applicable to the case 
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at bar. This Plaintiff never did anything to attempt to restrict 
visitation or to attempt to restrict the boys' contact with their 
father. As she testified at trial, in the early stages of their 
post divorce arrangements, she and the Defendant were able to 
amicably work with one another to be flexible in visitation. 
(T141, T142, T143). Even after the Plaintiff and the minor 
children relocated to Reno so the Plaintiff could reestablish a 
relationship and care for a dying parent, the boys were granted 
extended visitation with their father. Their father also 
travelled to Nevada to see them. In deference to the oldest 
son's fear that he would not be able to have a relationship with 
his father or that his father would die, the Plaintiff allowed 
him to reside with his father for nearly one year. In order to 
be fair to the younger child and to also foster a relationship 
between the boys and their father and to sustain the close 
sibling relationship, the Plaintiff agreed to allow the boys to 
reside with their father from June, 1987 through June, 19 88. 
Never has there been any sustainable finding that the Plaintiff 
has ever done anything over an extended time span to interfere 
with or hamper the relationship between the minor children and 
their father. In fact, the antithetical conclusion is accurate 
and appropriate. The Plaintiff has done everything in her power, 
including encouraging the boys to call their father on a regular 
and frequent basis and allowing them to reside with him for an 
extended period of time, to foster and nurture their 
relationship. 
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The same commitment to foster a relationship between the 
other biological parent is not evident on behalf of the 
Defendant. The Plaintiff testified that on both occasions when 
the Defendant had extended time with the children there was a 
severe lack of communication between herself and her sons. The 
Defendant did nothing to assure that the boys would contact the 
Plaintiff on a regular basis. Neither did he nor his current 
spouse do anything to encourage informative telephone 
conversations between the Plaintiff and her sons. (T146, T147, 
T148, T149, T151, T172, T173). The Court should take judicial 
notice of the affidavits and other evidence that has been 
presented to the Court in other matters which are previous to and 
subsequent to this Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. As 
an example, numerous people have submitted affidavits indicating 
that for many, many months the Defendant withheld contact between 
the Plaintiff and her sons in 1989. If there is any indication 
that there has been a willful refusal to allow visitation or 
contact the testimony always sustains the sad truth that it is 
the Defendant who interferes with and tries to diminish the 
relationship between the Plaintiff and the minor children. If 
there is any activity which has been undertaken which jeopardizes 
the best interest of the minor children, it has always been found 
that it is the Defendant who has initiated, acted upon, and 
attempted to justify his unconscionable behavior. 
The Defendant and his attorney argue that the removal of the 
children from the Defendant's domicile in November, 1987 
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destabilized them. This simply is not true. The evaluator, Dr. 
Louis Morse testified that he could not conclude that there was 
any clinical finding of instability as a result of the boysf 
return to the Plaintiff's physical custody. (T43). If indeed 
the removal might have had an unstabilizing effect, the same was 
not evident when Dr. Morse saw the children. 
The Defendant and his attorney argue that the case of Hirsch 
v. Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1986) is on point. This is simply 
not true. In Hirsch, infra, the original custodial parent was 
found to have evidenced a significant amount of instability as 
she had moved several times. In addition to the multiple moves, 
the original noncustodial parent had assumed care and 
responsibility for the parties1 child during a majority of the 
time subsequent to the parties' divorce. One of the relocations 
now complained about by the Defendant and his counsel occurred 
when Isaac and later Isaiah were allowed to reside in their 
father's home for an extended period of time. To say that 
fostering and actively promoting a healthy parent child 
relationship is tantamount to instability is absurd. Moreover, 
as testified at trial, these children were very young when their 
father and mother were divorced. The Plaintiff was the primary 
caretaker for each child during the duration of the marriage. 
Moreover, from 1981 until this date, she has been the parent who 
has had at all times legal custody of both children and she has 
had physical custody of both children except for a very minute 
amount of time. 
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On page 17 of the Defendant's brief, the Defendant and his 
attorney erroneously characterize the purported lack of contact 
between the Defendant and the minor children as an intentional 
plot instigated by the Plaintiff to deprive the Pierces of her 
phone number from November of 1987 until June, 1988. The 
documents introduced into evidence demonstrate that from 
November, 1987 until June, 1988 the children had a significant 
amount of telephone contact with their father. These telephone 
calls were placed with the Plaintiff's encouragement and 
permission from the children at their home to the Defendant at 
his home. Moreover, the Plaintiff testified that as of January 
12, 1988 the Defendant did indeed have her current home phone 
number. It was only shortly after the boys1 return to 
California, in the latter part of November, 1987, that the 
Plaintiff did change her telephone number. She had good reason 
to do so. While taking steps to ensure her privacy, she never 
undertook any action which would terminate or interfere with the 
boys' contact and communication with their father or stepmother. 
The Defendant and his counsel argue that merely because an 
11 year old child expresses a desire to live with his father or 
has a preference as to whom shall be his custodial parent the 
trial Court must abide by the wishes of a minor. If this were 
so, trial Court's would be deprived of their discretion and their 
better judgment in determining custody issues. Moreover, it is a 
sad matter to contemplate a legal system wherein children can 
dictate to adults, irregardless of whether or not they are 
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manipulated to form their stated preferences- The Defendant and 
his counsel conveniently ignore the fact that the youngest child 
had an equally strong preference to reside with his mother. 
Moreover, the youngest child expressed both to the evaluator, Dr. 
Morse, and to Judge Murphy that he had some genuine fear about 
living with his stepmother, Letha Pierce. (T15, T16, T17, T26, 
T27, T28, T38, T41, and T3, T4 of the proceedings held on January 
12, 1989). In Utah, there are a plethora of cases which have 
held that the preferences of a child or children as to with whom 
they should reside is not controlling upon the Court. Wiese v. 
Wiese, 469 P.2d 504 (Utah 1970). Likewise, there are controlling 
cases which establish valid case law that the opinions of a 
custody evaluator do not have to be adopted automatically by the 
trial Court. Martinez v^ Martinez, 652 P.2d 934 (Utah 1982). 
Isaiah, the parties1 youngest son, has a fear of being with 
his stepmother. He unequivocally and repeatedly expressed this 
fear of his stepmother and his dislike of her parenting style and 
her disciplinary style to Dr. Morse and to Judge Murphy. At 
trial, Dr. Morse testified that the stepmother, Letha Pierce, has 
more contact with both boys than does their father when they are 
residing in the Pierce household. (T38). The amount of 
interaction between the stepmother and the boys was a continuing 
concern to the Plaintiff. The Defendant testified at trial that 
the boys' mother expressed a concern about the relationship 
between Isaiah and his stepmother. It is evident that the 
Plaintiff was trying to minimize Isaiah's fears yet permit a 
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relationship between the child, his father, and his stepmother. 
(T85, T86). 
Isaiah also had a stated preference. Specifically, his 
preference has been to reside with his mother, the custodial 
parent. It was Dr. Morse's finding that both families are 
capable of adequately providing for the children. (T15, T39). 
It was also the finding of Dr. Morse and the Court that the boys 
should not be separated. (T16, T40, T183). It was also the 
finding of the trial Court that Isaac would better adjust to 
remaining with his mother than Isaiah would adapt to having 
custody transferred to his father. (T3 of the proceedings on 
January 12, 1989). It is absolutely preposterous to presume and 
demand that because a child is the oldest and/or is the most 
vocal that his preferences should be given greater deference 
than a younger sibling. It is also preposterous and frightening 
to accept the proposition that an older sibling who is more vocal 
or more articulate should be able to make decisions which could 
be harmful or detrimental to a younger sibling. 
The Court in Kramer v. Kramer, supra, clearly articulated a 
thoughtful analysis of the very compelling evidence which must 
be presented to demonstrate a legally cognizable change of 
circumstances which would justify a change of custody. The Court 
in Kramer stated at pages 625 and 626: 
...Under Hogge and Becker, the trial court 
was correct in focusing only on changes in 
circumstances affecting the custodial parent 
in deciding whether to reopen the custody 
decree. 
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Hogge established a two-prong test for 
considering requests to change custody 
awards, imposing the burden of proof on the 
party seeking change of custody. Under the 
first prong, the party seeking modification 
must show that there has been a change in the 
circumstances upon which the original custody 
award was based which substantially and 
materially affects the custodial parent's 
parenting ability or the functioning of the 
custodial relationship and which justifies 
reopening the custody question. Once a 
substantial change of circumstances has been 
established, the petitioner must show under 
the second prong that the requested change in 
custody is in the best interest of the child. 
See Hogge 649 P.2d at 5 3-54. The "change of 
circumstances" threshold is high to 
discourage frequent petitions for 
modification of custody decrees. The test 
was designed to "protect the custodial parent 
from harassment by repeated litigation and 
(to) protect the child from 'ping-pong1 
custody awards." Id. This policy has been 
adhered to and " elaborated upon in our 
subsequent cases dealing with change of 
custody matters. 
A central premise of our recent child custody 
cases is the view that stable custody 
arrangements are of critical importance to 
the child's proper development. See, e.g., 
Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714 P.2d 1131, 1132 
(Utah 1986); Shioji v^ Shioji, 712 P.2d 197, 
203 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting); 
Becker v. Becker 694 P.2d 608,610 (Utah 
1984); Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 55 (Utah 
1982); B. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of 
Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-
Balancing the Individual and Social Interest, 
81 Mich.L.Rev. 463, 473-74 (1983). The two-
part Hogge test is founded upon that premise. 
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54. No matter 
how well intentioned, changes in custody can 
do more harm than good. See Hafen, supra, at 
474. For this reascin, when a trial court is 
asked to determine whether there has been a 
change of circumstances sufficient to warrant 
reopening a custody decree, ordinarily it 
must focus exclusively on the paremting 
ability of the custodial parent and the 
functioning of the established custodial 
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relationship. This was recognized in Becker 
v^ Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1984) 
where, in interpreting Hogge, we held that 
the first step of the Hogge standard required 
that "(t)he asserted change (in 
circumstances)...have some material 
relationship to and substantial effect on 
parenting ability or the functioning of the 
presently existing custodial relationship" 
Id. at 610 (emphasis added). 
There was not one iota of credible evidence given by any 
witness at the modification hearing which gave any indication 
that the Plaintiff had become incapable of adequately parenting 
her children. In fact, the custody evaluator found just the 
opposite. (T15, T39, T45). Nor was there any testimony or any 
evidence that the custodial arrangement wherein the Plaintiff is 
the legal custodian and has the physical custody of the children 
has become nonfunctioning, unhealthy, or in any way detrimental 
to the children. Absolutely unequivocally, given the fact that 
there was nothing produced at the hearing which gave any 
indication of any adverse impact to the Plaintiff's parenting 
ability or to the functioning of the relationship between she and 
her children, the Defendant failed to meet the first prong of 
the bifurcated Hogge, supra, test. The Court was absolutely 
correct in its finding that there had been no substantial change 
of circumstances which would mandate or even allow a transfer of 
custody from the Plaintiff to the Defendant. In this instance, 
and in every instance litigated by the Defendant subsequent to 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce, he has sought to obtain 
custody of his sons while being able to identify only the most 
minimal of facts and justification. 
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The Defendant and his attorney argue that the proper 
standard for review at the trial Court level and now is the less 
rigid standard adopted in Maughan v. Maughan, supra. The 
rationale for Maughan as stated by the Court at page 160 was: 
If, on the other hand, the initial custody 
award is premised on a temporary condition, a 
choice between marginal custody arrangements, 
a default decree, or similar exceptional 
criteria, the trial court may properly focus 
its "inquiry into the effects on the child of 
the established custodial relationship as it 
has developed over time." Id^ . at 6 27 n.5. 
This inquiry is necessarily less rigid 
because the trial court has not previously 
had an opportunity to make a thorough 
examination of the child's best interest, or, 
if so, has been compelled to make a choice 
between the lesser of two evils. Under those 
circumstances, the Court may accept a greater 
range of evidence under Hogge' s first prong 
regarding the initial custody arrangement, 
the events that have since transpired, and 
the resulting effects on the child. 
The less rigid standard of Maughan, supra, should not be applied 
and are not applicable in this instance. Admittedly, the 
Defendant did not challenge the initial award of custody to the 
Plaintiff. However, it was certainly known by the trial Court 
that both children were very young when their parents divorced 
and that it was in the children's best interest for them to 
remain with their mother, particularly as she had been the 
primary caretaker since their birth. Moreover, in numerous 
litigations instituted subsequent to the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, the Third Judicial District Court has had ample 
opportunity to examine the relationship between the Plaintiff and 
her children. At no hearing and certainly not at the hearing 
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held on January 11, 1989 and January 12, 1989 was there any 
indication that there was anything detrimental, harmful, 
inappropriate, or unhealthy in the relationship between the 
Plaintiff and either child. Dr. Morse did note that the children 
were bonded with the Plaintiff and that both loved the Plaintiff. 
At no time was any Court required to make a choice between 
marginal custody arrangements or to choose the lesser of two 
evils to best suit the future interests of the minor children. 
The Plaintiff has been flexible in her arrangements with the 
Defendant wherein she has even allowed him extended physical 
custody of the children. She has, with minimal exceptions which 
span a course of several years, been consistent in encouraging 
and allowing the boys communication and contact with their 
father. There may have been one or two insignificant instances 
of miscommunication which resulted in a lack of visitation by the 
Defendant. Although these may be censurable, they have never 
risen to the level of warranting a transfer of custody. 
The trial Court gave considerable latitude to the evidence 
which the Defendant was allowed to present. Not only was he 
allowed to introduce evidence of issues which had been previously 
litigated in post divorce proceedings, he was granted an 
opportunity, which he could not sustain, to establish that there 
had been a concerted effort on the part of the Plaintiff to 
thwart his visitation and that the efforts allegedly put forth by 
the Plaintiff had been successful. This Plaintiff has time and 
time again demonstrated her ability to properly care for the 
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children and to put forth their best interest. It certainly was 
not easy for her to allow the children to reside with their 
father for any extended period of time. However, she did so 
without complaint. She even allowed a second opportunity for 
extended visitation when she agreed to allow Isaiah to have an 
entire year with his father although she had been denied access 
and contact with Isaac when he was with his father for the 
initial extended period of visitation. 
The Court's primary focus is properly the effect of the 
present custodial arrangements upon the minor chilcfren. No one 
who was heard at trial was able to give any reason, concrete or 
intangible that the present custodial arrangement had negatively 
or detrimentally impacted the children. These boys were seen by 
Judge Murphy to be well adjusted. Although thei boys were aware 
of the ongoing litigation, the custody evaluator did not find any 
clinical evidence that the possible manipulation by both sets of 
parents or the knowledge of the litigations had any adverse 
effect upon the children. Nor was there any indication that even 
though experiencing and being subjected to numerous battles over 
their custody the boys had been adversely impacted. (T32, T33). 
It is certainly commendable that any resentment that the 
Plaintiff may have had over being engaged in numerous litigations 
between she and her former husband did not become apparent to 
either child. Nor did the Plaintiff's strong reservations about 
relinquishing physical custody or having either child reside with 
their father on a temporary basis negatively impact the strong 
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emotional bonds and ties between the Plaintiff and her children. 
It is absolutely uncontroverted that whether applying the test 
formulated in Kramer/ supra, or Maughan, supra, the Defendant 
could not and did not demonstrate any legally cognizable change 
of circumstances which would justify transferring custody. 
Having failed to meet his burden of proof, there is no rational 
reason or legally meritorious reason why he should prevail and be 
awarded custody of the boys. 
Moreover, it is compelling to realize that the Defendant and 
his counsel are patently mistaken when they assert that the 
standard of review should be either the standard promulgated in 
Kramer, supra, or in Maughan, supra. Those determinations were 
within the discretion of the trial Court. It is the proper focus 
of the appellate Court to determine only if the findings and 
rulings of the trial Court were so patently erroneous that they 
warrant reversal. The evidence presented at the hearing fully 
supported the refusal of the trial Court to change custody. 
There is no rationale which has been articulate by the Defendant 
upon which he should have prevailed at trial or upon which he 
should now prevail. 
II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT IT WAS 
IN THE BEST INTEREST TO REMAIN WITH THEIR 
MOTHER BECAUSE OF ISAIAH'S FEAR OF HIS 
STEPMOTHER. 
The fear that Isaiah expressed of his stepmother is not the 
only reason articulated by the Court in its finding that a 
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transfer of custody from the Plaintiff to the Defendant would not 
be in the best interest of the minor children- The trial Court 
felt that not only should the boys not be separated, but that 
Isaac would adjust to not residing with his father better than 
Isaiah would adjust to a transfer of custody. There is no doubt 
that a transfer of custody is traumatic as has been noted in 
cases previously cited. Transfers of custody can do more harm 
than good. 
The Defendant and his attorney argue and assert that 
Isaiah's fear of his stepmother was the result of programming by 
his family in Chico, California and was not premised upon any 
reality. Not only is this a mischaracterization of Dr. Morse's 
testimony, this argument totally ignores other evidence which was 
presented at the modification hearing. Upon cross examination by 
counsel for the Plaintiff, Dr. Morse specifically 
stated, "I think that Isaiah believes that he is afraid of his 
step-mother. Yes." (T26). Dr. Morse's findings that Isaiah 
stated he was afraid of his stepmother were examined when the 
evaluator was questioned by counsel for both parties. Dr. Morse 
did state that a problem that he foresaw in a transferring of 
custody of both boys to the Defendant would be the fact that 
Isaiah is afraid of his stepmother and that she had engaged in 
conduct which made him uncomfortable and fearful. (T16, T17, 
T26, T28). 
It is extremely telling and convincing that other parties 
recognized Isaiah's fears long before this Petition to Modify was 
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filed with the Court and long before Dr. Morse evaluated either 
child. Peggy Rogers, a close friend of the Plaintiff and a 
formerly close friend of the Defendant, testified that her sons 
and the parties1 sons were very close. Ms. Rogers did testify 
that she had had opportunity to watch Isaiah and his stepmother 
interact. It was her perception that Isaiah is uneasy with his 
stepmother. (T133, T134). 
The Plaintiff also testified that Isaiah's fears of his 
stepmother were not recent. In her testimony she indicated that 
Isaiah had articulated for some time specific reasons why he was 
afraid of his stepmother and why he did not want to go to his 
father's home. (T179, T180). These fears were also articulated 
to Judge Murphy who found that it was the perception of both boys 
that Isaiah was treated differently than Isaac in his father's 
home. (T3, T4 of the proceedings held on January 12, 1989). 
In her testimony, Ms. Peggy Rogers also identified a very 
real reason why Isaiah should feel fearful when in the custody of 
his father and stepmother. The incidents related by Ms. Rogers 
were not discussed by Dr. Morse. It is arguable that if the 
custody evaluator had known of these, he would have put more 
credence in the fears expressed by Isaiah. Ms. Rogers did 
testify that the planned week long visit between her children and 
the Pierce children were unexpectedly interrupted by Letha 
Pierce's removal of the children from her home. Ms. Rogers 
further testified that Letha Pierce had given her specific 
instructions that neither child was to have any telephonic 
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communication or personal contact with their mother while they 
were at her home. (T131, T132, T133). 
The testimony given by Dr. Harold J. Shaw, Jr. at the 
modification hearing was testimony that preceded the incidents 
related by Isaiah wherein he felt that he was unfairly 
disciplined by his stepmother, wherein he believed that his 
stepmother spanked him much too frequently and much too long, 
prior to the time the children were in the Rogers1 home and were 
specifically prohibited by Mrs. Pierce from having any contact 
with their mother, and prior to the time that Mrs. Pierce did 
abruptly remove the children from the Rogers' home. 
Specifically, Dr. Shaw testified that his observations of the 
interactions between the Pierce's and the Defendant and the 
parties1 minor sons occurred several years ago. (T102). These 
occasions when Dr. Shaw had opportunity to view the interaction 
between the minor children and their father and stepmother also 
primarily occurred during religiously oriented activities. 
(T102). It is arguable that not only would the Defendant and his 
spouse be displaying exemplary behavior while attending church 
or religious functions, but that their relationships with the 
children would have deteriorated after several frightening 
experiences were imposed upon Isaiah and his brother. 
The Plaintiff was accompanied by several friends who had 
known both she and her former husband for several years. Each of 
these witnesses would have testified to Isaiah's fears of his 
stepmother and other related matters which would compel not 
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tampering with custody. However, these witnesses were not put on 
the witness stand as the time allocated for the hearing was 
nearly up. There had been an indication from the Court that the 
trial Judge hoped the other witnesses were not necessary. 
(T203). 
Every witness who presented testimony at trial clearly 
substantiated that there was a very strong bond between Isaiah 
and his mother. Nearly every witness indicated that Isaiah had 
articulated and stated that he was fearful of his stepmother. It 
was and is important that a child's fears should not be 
discounted for any reason. The clear and convincing evidence 
presented at trial amply documented that Isaiah had a long 
standing fear of his stepmother. To perpetuate these fears and 
to possibly intensify them by transferring custody of the 
children to the Defendant would clearly be improper and clearly 
would be antithetical to the best interest of the children. 
The Defendant and his attorney make much of the fact that 
the trial Court failed to follow the recommendations of the 
custody evaluator. This is neither surprising nor erroneous. 
Although it is true that Dr. Morse did recommend that custody of 
Isaac and Isaiah be transferred to their father he did so in 
recognition of Isaac's stated preferences. It is not erroneous 
for the Court to have concluded that Isaiah's preferences not to 
change custody should have been of paramount concern. This is 
especially true considering the fact that it was apparent that 
Isaiah was strongly bonded to his mother, was immature, and would 
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not have adapted easily to being separated from his mother. The 
trial Court had several witnesses in addition to Dr. Morse who 
clearly testified that Isaiah was afraid of his stepmother. 
Moreover, these witnesses gave compelling reasons why Isaiah 
should logically be fearful of residing with his father and of 
potentially losing contact with his mother. 
The Defendant and his attorney fail to acknowledge that Dr. 
Morse's primary rationale for his decision was not that Isaac 
preferred to live with his father but his perception and 
professional recommendation that the boys should not be 
separated. Dr. Morse testified that a child's preference need 
not be controlling upon the Court but should be considered. He 
further stated that "The most important part of my recommendation 
is that the boys should be kept together, and that they would 
suffer psychological damage if they were separated." (T40). 
In making his recommendation to the Court and in doing the 
initial interviews and evaluation, Dr. Morse failed to identify 
any single factor much less a combination of factors which would 
rise to the level of a substantial change of circumstances since 
either the implementation of the original custody award or the 
denial of the Defendant's subsequent Petitions to Modify the 
Decree of Divorce. It was certainly within the prerogative and 
the discretion of the trial Court to give minimum weight to an 
evaluation that approached the situation as if this were an 
initial custody determination and not a post divorce Petition to 
Change Custody. (T38, T39, T40). 
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It is fallacious for the Defendant or his attorney to 
maintain that the trial Court did not make adequate findings as 
to why the Defendant's Petition to Modify Custody was denied. 
Judge Murphy articulated both findings and conclusions which were 
clearly supported by a definite preponderance of the evidence 
that neither was there a substantial change of circumstances 
which would warrant a change of custody but that the best 
interest of the children would not be served by transferring 
custody. Specifically, Judge Murphy found that the alleged 
difficulties with visitation did not rise to a level of a 
substantial change of circumstances. (T2 of the proceedings held 
January 12, 1989). Judge Murphy also found that it would not be 
in the best interest of the minor children to transfer custody to 
the Defendant both because of Isaiah's perceptions of his 
stepmother and because he would be less likely to adapt well to a 
change of circumstances than Isaac would be able to adapt to 
continuing to reside with the Plaintiff. (T3 of the proceedings 
held January 12, 1989). 
The trial Court was extremely articulate in its findings and 
conclusions. It appears that the Defendant's real objections is 
not that there were inadequate findings but simply that there 
were not multiple findings articulated by the Court for its 
rulings. However, the initial question of whether or not the 
alleged interferences with the visitation constituted a 
substantial change of circumstances and whether the same mandated 
a change of custody were relatively straight forward and easily 
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analyzed. This issue which prompted the Defendant to file this 
particular Petition to Change Custody was not complex and did not 
require multiple findings by the trial Court. 
As noted previously, the proper standard for review are 
neither those established by Kramer, supra, or Maughan, supra. 
As in all appellate decisions, this Court must not second guess 
what has previously occurred at trial or hearing. Rather, the 
primary focus and analysis of the appellate Court is to determine 
whether or not the decision of the lower Court is substantiated 
by record evidence. As noted in Kramer, supra at page 628: 
It is the trial, court's prerogative to hear 
and weigh conflicting evidence and to make 
findings of fact. We will not upset such 
findings when they are supported by 
substantiated record evidence. Fontenot v. 
Fontenot, 714 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1986); 
Shioj i v^ Shioj i, 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 
1985); Mineer v. Mineer, 706 P.2d 1060, 1062 
(Utah 1985); Nils'on v^ Nilson, 652 P.2d 1323, 
1324-25 (Utah 1982)"; Turner v. Turner, 649 
P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 
615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980); Jorqensen y_;_ 
Jorqensen, 599 P.2d 510, 511-12 (Utah 1979); 
Hunsaker v. Fake, 563 P.2d 784, 786 (Utah 
1977); Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 179 
(Utah 1977) . 
Moreover, as stated in Fullmer, supra at page 945: 
After viewing the evidence in this light, the 
trial court's decision will not be disturbed 
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion or 
manifest injustice. See Kramer v. Kramer, 
738 P.2d 624, 628 (Utah 1987); Fontenot v. 
Fontenot, 714 P.2d 1131, 1132-33 (Utah 1986) 
(per curiam). 
The Defendant has failed to identify any situation or make any 
argument which was not rebutted by clear and compelling evidence. 
He has further failed to establish other criteria enunciated by 
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Hogge and adapted in numerous subsequent cases. Lastly, the 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial Court abused 
its discretion or that the ruling of the trial Court not to alter 
the custodial status quo was a manifest injustice. The extreme 
deference given to the findings of the trial Court was recently 
reiterated in the case of Riche v. Riche, Case Number 890090-
CA (Utah App. December 18, 1989). Not only did the Defendant 
fail to meet his burden of proof at trial, he has again failed 
upon appeal to meet his burden of proof. There is no legally 
cognizable theory upon which custody should have then or should 
now be awarded to the Defendant. 
III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE 
DEFENDANT. 
The Court did allow the Plaintiff to testify regarding her 
conversations with numerous people. All of these conversations 
were investigations conducted by the Plaintiff prior to making 
the determination that it was in the best interest of Isaac and 
Isaiah to remove them from their father's home. The 
conversations that were related by the Plaintiff were valid 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Specifically, these 
conversations were exceptions noted in Rule 803(3) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The child protective worker in Juab County 
indicated that it was his opinion (or his then present state of 
mind) that there needed to be an investigation of the alleged 
abuse of Amy and Steven Slater and more compellingly that it was 
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almost certain that while the investigation was being conducted. 
Isaac and Isaiah would be placed in foster care. However, each 
and every time that the trial Court overruled an objection as to 
the possible hearsay of the matters being related by the 
Plaintiff, the Court very carefully explained that the statements 
were being allowed not as proof of the truth of the matter being 
asserted but rather to show the effect that the statements 
communicated to the Plaintiff had upon her- (T154, T159). The 
very limited purpose for which this testimony was admitted was 
not prejudicial to the Defendant. The Court absolutely needed to 
know what impact external events were having on the Plaintiff and 
what motivated her to act as she did. 
No one requested that Plaintiff or counsel make a showing at 
trial that the actual witnesses could not testify. This is 
probably, upon retrospection, because the testimony was admitted 
for very limited purposes and because the time allocated for this 
hearing was very short. Plaintiff did not have ample opportunity 
to have all of her witnesses who were present in Court testify. 
To now argue that the Plaintiff should have called additional 
parties to Court is specious. Not only was there no time for any 
additional witnesses it is preposterous to now argue that the 
Plaintiff should have had to bear* the additional expense of 
calling several more witnesses, all of whom would have had to 
travel great distances to attend trial and to further utilize the 
Courtfs time to resolve the issues. 
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It is unnecessary and absurd to request that this case be 
remanded for further hearing as the Defendant has requested. To 
do so would require* the Plaintiff to expend much more time, 
energy, and money in bringing forth several witnesses who would 
verify their conversations with her. Moreover, to require a 
relitigation of these issues would unwisely appropriate time 
which the trial Court could better expend resolving other 
matters. There is no indication to believe that calling any of 
the parties to whom the Plaintiff spoke prior to her removal of 
the boys from the Defendant's home in November, 1987 would result 
in any new evidence being put forth. Nor is there any indication 
that any of these witnesses would not affirm precisely what was 
related to the Court by the Plaintiff. Absent any indication 
that there is even the minutest possibility that the findings of 
the trial Court would be reversed, it is unnecessary and unwise 
to require the additional rehearing of these issues. Again, note 
the Defendant's assertion that it was the Plaintiff who 
subjected the parties' children to "ping-pong" custody issues by 
returning the boys to her in November, 19 87 is unwarranted and 
erroneous. To fault the Plaintiff for acting as a concerned 
parent, both in being flexible with the visitation given the 
Defendant and in exercising her prerogative as a concerned parent 
(much less concerned custodial parent), is ironic but not subject 
to any credibility. 
The Defendant and his attorney have failed to advance any 
compelling arguments that the trial Court committed prejudicial 
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error even if the testimony of the Plaintiff relating her 
conversations with numerous people prior to her arrival in Utah 
in November, 1987 was hearsay• Absent any argument or finding 
that the Defendant had been prejudiced by the admission of this 
evidence and any finding that the refusal to allow the alleged 
hearsay evidence into the record would have altered the outcome 
of the case, the Defendant is not entitled to having this matter 
remanded for further hearing or to having the custody of the 
parties1 minor children given to him. As noted in Clausen vs. 
Clausen, 675 P.2d 562 (Utah 1983) at 565: 
Since it appears that none of the exceptions 
set forth in the statute apply in this case, 
it was error for the Court to admit the 
testimony of Mrs. Powell concerning the 
Defendant's feelings and emotional condition 
at the time of their interview. It is clear 
that the counsellor's knowledge could have 
come only from communications covered by the 
statute. However, it appears that the error 
was harmless in that it did not alter the 
outcome of the case. 
Everyone of the persons to whom the Plaintiff spoke, whether in 
Utah or California, would document that there were serious 
reasons to believe that two young people in the Pierce household 
had been abused. Moreover, it was confirmed that an 
investigation was going to be forthcoming by the Juab County 
Division of Family Services, It was also confirmed that Isaac 
and Isaiah would most likely be removed and placed in foster care 
until the Social Services investigation was completed. Every 
thing that the Plaintiff learned heightened her apprehension for 
the well being of her sons. The Plaintiff did not immediately or 
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rashly act to remove Isaac and Isaiah from their father's home. 
She did as much investigation of the allegations as possible. 
Only after learning that foster care placement was probable and 
imminent did she come to Utah and regain physical custody of both 
boys. The statements made by the Plaintiff, if indeed deemed to 
be hearsay, were not prejudicial and did not impact the final 
determination of the trial Court. Consequently, their admission 
was harmless. 
IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO AMEND THE 
FINDINGS AS PER THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
AMEND FINDINGS. 
Certainly, the Defendant and his attorney were upset that 
there had been no written Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law 
that neither Amy nor Steven Slater were abused. However, the 
issue of whether or not these individuals were actually abused 
was not a central issue to this case. The central issue was 
whether or not there had been interference with the Defendant's 
visitation which (a) constituted a substantial change of 
circumstances and (b) would warrant, for the best interests of 
the minor children, transferring their legal and physical custody 
from the Plaintiff to the Defendant. The matters that the 
Defendant sought to have included in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were irrelevant and extraneous. Certainly, 
neither this trial Court nor any trial Court should ever be 
required to obfuscate its rationale or rulings with nonmaterial, 
unimportant, trivial, or extraneous matters. 
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Counsel for the Defendant and the Defendant argue that the 
findings articulated in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as drafted by counsel by 
the Plaintiff were not discxassed. Argument contained previously 
in this brief documents very clearly that these issues were 
discussed at the hearing and were considered by the Court. 
Moreover, when issuing his ruling, Judge Murphy did indicate that 
his statements to the parties and his pronouncement of his 
decision was not a substitute for Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. He did instruct counsel for the prevailing 
party to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Tl, 
T2 of the proceedings held January 12, 1989). 
It is merely extraneous semantics to argue that the Court 
did not find that Isaiah's fears were concrete, real and 
pervasive. These fears were* identified and articulated by Isaiah 
on more than one occasion to several people. Moreover, as with 
Ms. Peggy Rogers, even though Isaiah did not specifically 
articulate his fear of his stepmother, she too was able to notice 
the same. The Court's indication that although Isaiah's feelings 
may not be justified, those were truly his feelings. These 
feelings and this perception of fear compelled Isaiah to attempt 
to minimize the contact with his mother so she would not have any 
indication that there were any difficulties and did cause him to 
unequivocally state that he wished to remain in his mother's care 
and custody. To argue a semantic issue and premise one's hope 
for reversal of a well founded decision upon the same is nothing 
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more than a desperate grasp at illusory, nonexistent legal 
straws. 
V. 
THE COURT SHOULD AWARD JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT FOR ALL COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INCURRED BY THE PLAINTIFF AT TRIAL AND UPON 
APPEAL. 
The Defendant once again initiated a nonmeritorious action 
to gain custody of his minor sons. There simply was no adequate 
foundation or rationale for this action. This was clearly 
demonstrated by the Courtfs finding that the Defendant failed to 
meet either prong of the test promulgated in Hogge, supra. 
Additionally, the Defendant has subjected the Plaintiff to 
additional costs and attorney's fees for defending against a 
frivolous appeal. The Court in Riche, supra, at page 7 has 
defined a frivolous appeal as follows: 
A frivolous appeal has been defined as one 
without reasonable legal or factual basis as 
defined in Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
40(a). Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. 
Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Sanction for bringing 
a frivolous appeal "should only be applied in 
egregious cases less there be an improper 
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous 
lower court decisions." Porco v. Porco, 752 
P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The 
Porco court categorized egregious cases as 
those obviously without merit, with no 
reasonable likelihood of prevailing and which 
result in delaying and implementing a 
judgment. Id.; See also Arvin Harpswell 
Assfn v^ Day, 438 A.2d 234, 239 (Me. 1981) 
(per curiam). Husband's appeal, while 
unsuccessful, was not frivolous on the issue 
of visitation and should not be subjected to 
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Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 33(a) 
sanctions. 
It has been clearly demonstrated that there was no factual 
reason for initiating this litigation other than the Defendant's 
disappointment that the children no longer were with him. There 
was no factual or legal reason to believe that the Plaintiff had 
ever violated the Defendant's right to have visitation with his 
children, had interfered unreasonably with any visitation, that 
the parenting ability had dimished or ceased to exist, that the 
relationship between the Plaintiff and her sons was non-
functional, or that she had done anything which would jeopardize 
the well being of her children. Mere anger or disappointment or 
mere desire not to give up until one reaches a stated objective 
is insufficient reason to keep subjecting other parties to 
ongoing litigation. Counsel and the Plaintiff would respectfully 
request that appropriate sanctions be awarded against the 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
A most appropriate synopsis of this appeal and the 
underlying litigation is an analogy. The Defendant is just like 
an individual who enters a bakery and is given a cookie when 
there. Not gratified or satisfied, he decides that he must be 
given the entire contents of the store. The Plaintiff, in a-
very flexible and generous action, granted the Defendant 
temporary, physical custody of the parties1 minor sons. This was 
done to allay fears that Isaac had regarding the possible loss of 
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his father and to treat both boys fairly. The Plaintiff was 
doing nothing other than attempting to further nurture, and 
foster the relationship between the Defendant and his sons. 
Unforeseen circumstances absolutely mandated the boysf removal 
from their father's home. However, once the Defendant had been 
granted extended visitation with his minor sons, he was not 
satisfied with a small cookie, rather he wanted the entire 
bakery and once again brought a specious action to gain custody 
of his sons and to be given absolutely everything that he 
desired. It is irrelevant and immaterial to the Defendant that 
transferring custody would have been harmful to one of his sons. 
His desires not the best interest of his children motivated this 
action and every action that he has initiated subsequent to the 
entry of the initial Decree of Divorce. Counsel for the 
Plaintiff and her client respectfully request that this Court 
reject the Defendant's arguments on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c£oZ?L day of February, 1990. 
/7 
Carolypr DriscolZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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